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Abstract
In this paper, we study infinitely repeated games with imperfect public moni-
toring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an efficient algorithm
to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each dis-
count factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with
a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.
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1 Introduction
The theory of infinitely repeated games is used to address a wide range of topics
in economics and social sciences, like employment relations, international agree-
ments, or cartels. Results that help to find equilibria in these games and numerical
procedures to quickly calculate examples are therefore of great importance. Al-
though several theoretical breakthroughs on how to compute equilibrium value
sets have been made, so far no exact algorithm exists to generally characterize the
set of sequential equilibrium payoffs in infinitely repeated games, even if attention
is restricted to public monitoring and pure strategies. In this paper, we present
an algorithm to exactly compute the set of pure strategy equilibrium payoffs for
arbitrary discount factors in infinitely repeated games with monetary transfers
and imperfect public monitoring.1
Developing methods to compute the set of equilibrium payoffs for general stage
games and arbitrary discount factors has been the focus of a small literature in-
cluding Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990, henceforth APS), Judd, Yeltekin and
Conklin (2003, henceforth JYC) as well as Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994) for
strongly symmetric equilibria. APS develop a conceptual algorithm to compute
the payoff sets for repeated games with imperfect monitoring and arbitrary dis-
count factors. They show that the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs is a
fixed point of a monotone operator applied on candidates for the sets of equilib-
rium payoffs. One can iteratively apply this operator to compute the payoff set.
In each iteration, one has to solve a series of static problems with enforceable
continuation payoffs taken from the current candidate set of equilibrium payoffs.
Yet, as JYC point out, the general method of APS is not directly implementable
on a computer because it requires approximation of arbitrary sets.
JYC analyze the special case of perfect monitoring. In addition, they augment
the stage game by a public randomization device, which allows to restrict attention
to convex sets of continuation payoffs. They develop a method to compute upper
and lower approximations for the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs and to construct strategy profiles that can support payoffs from the lower
approximation. The method of JYC is still limited in so far that finding fine
1A software package, programmed in R, that implements the algorithms is available on the
second author’s website http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/kranz/software.htm
For a description of the software and several examples, see Kranz (2010).
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approximations for the equilibrium payoff sets for several discount factors remains
computationally expensive, it is restricted to games with perfect monitoring, and
does not provide much guidance for finding analytical closed-form solutions.
In the present paper, we allow for actions that can only be imperfectly moni-
tored, but make the assumption that observable monetary transfers can be con-
ducted. Our analysis is therefore only applicable to those economic environments
in which monetary transfers are plausible, which is true for many interactions.
Repeated games with monetary transfers have been used to study employment
relations (Levin 2002, 2003, Malcomson and MacLeod, 1989), sovereign lending
(Atkeson, 1991, Kletzer and Wright, 2000), team production (Doornik 2006, Rayo
2007), cartels2 (Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007, and also Athey and Bagwell,
2001) or other business to business relationships (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy,
2002).
Most of these articles consider stationary equilibria in which a single action
profile is repeated in every period and any deviation from a required payment
will be punished by an infinite reversion to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Levin (2003) shows that stationay equilibria are indeed optimal in a class of prin-
cipal agent games. Our paper extends this result by showing for a general class of
games that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented by station-
ary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments, in which a deviation from a
required monetary transfer is punished by playing a punishment action profile for
one period. We derive this result for the case that money burning is possible. We
also establish a related result for the case that players cannot burn money but use
a public correlation device.
The algorithm to compute the set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs boils
down to finding optimal action profiles for the equilibrium path and for the pun-
ishment of each player. Similar to the algorithms of APS and JYC, our algorithm
solves several static linear optimization problems for all relevant action profiles.
In APS and JYC these optimization problems have to be repeated for different
candidate sets of continuation payoffs and the whole algorithm has to be repeated
for different discount factors. In our framework, we show that a single number,
which has a natural interpretation as the totally available liquidity in a setting
with enforcable payments, already contains all relevant information about the set
2Harrington and Skrzypacz (2007) explain how the Lysine and Citric Acid Cartells imple-
mented monetary transfers via sales between the cartel members.
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of continuation payoffs. Standard re-optimization techniques allow to quickly solve
the static problems for all relevant levels of liquidity. One implication is that our
algorithm directly computes payoff sets for the whole interval of discount factors
and exactly characterizes the critical discount factors at which optimal equilibrium
and punishment action profiles change.
For the special case of perfect monitoring, we obtain closed-form solutions for
all static problems.3 To compute the sets of equilibrium payoffs for all discount
factors, one essentially has to calculate stage-game best-reply payoffs and sort
the stage game action profiles. The resulting characterization of all pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is almost as simple as the one in Cronshaw and
Luenberger (1994), who provide a characterization of the set of strongly symmetric
subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games with perfect monitoring and a public
randomization device.
For arbitrary games with imperfect public monitoring, there is no general
closed-form solution for the static problems. Yet, we illustrate for a noisy prison-
ers’ dilemma game with a non-degenerate signal structure how analytical solutions
for the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be obtained. The
example also illustrates how, due to monitoring imperfections, money burning can
be optimal on the equilibrium path.
Money burning is a very explicit way of modeling inefficiencies that may opti-
mally arise in an equilibrium following a signal that indicates a deviation. Other
forms of inefficient continuation play can of course serve the same function. To
better understand the role of money burning, we characterize the payoff set in
repeated games in which players do not burn money but have access to a public
correlation device. In this framework, every equilibrium payoff can be implemented
by a modification of stationary equilibria: with some probability, which can de-
pend on the realized signal, there will be a transition to a collective punishment
state. We show how the equilibrium payoff set for the case without money burn-
ing can be computed by considering stationary equilibria that allow for money
burning but satisfy an additional constraint on the maximal amount of money
burning. In general, the set of equilibrium payoffs can shrink if money burning
is not possible. If, however, the stage game has a Nash equilibrium that gives
each player her min-max payoff, the possibility of money burning does not enlarge
3See also Kranz and Ohlendorf, (2009), where we derive a related result for two player games
with perfect monitoring in order to study renegotiation-proofness.
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the equilibrium payoff set of the repeated game. For games with perfect moni-
toring, money burning can only be neccesary to implement a Pareto dominated
equilibrium payoff.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model and stationary strategy profiles. Section 3 derives the main results. In
Section 4, we show how the results simplify for games with perfect monitoring and
illustrate the resulting algorithm with a simple Cournot game. Section 5 illustrates
for a noisy prisoners’ dilemma game how closed-form analytical solutions can be
obtained for games with imperfect public monitoring. In Section 6, we explore the
case without money burning. Section 7 briefly concludes.
2 Model and Stationary Strategy Profiles
2.1 The game
We consider an infinitely repeated n-player game with imperfect public monitoring
and common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). The timing in each period is as follows:
at the beginning of a period, there is a payment stage in which the players have
the opportunity to make nonnegative monetary transfers to each other or to burn
money. In a subsequent action stage, the players play a simultaneous move stage
game, and then there is again a payment stage in which they can make monetary
transfers.4
The stage game played in the action stage has the following structure. Each
player i has a finite action space Ai.
5 The set of stage game action profiles is
given by A = A1 × ... × An. After an action profile a ∈ A is chosen, nature
draws a commonly observed signal y from a finite signal space Y. The probability
distribution of signals depends on the selected action profile a, and is given by a
function φ(y|a) with
φ(y|a) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y, a ∈ A∑
y∈Y
φ(y|a) = 1 for all a ∈ A
4That we allow two payment stages emphasizes that players can make transfers at any point
in the game, and it simplifies some formulae. However, the set of equilibrium payoffs stays the
same if payments can be made only at the beginning of a period.
5Many of our results extend to action spaces that are compact subsets of Rm.
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Stage game payoffs of player i depend only on the signal y and the action ai
that player i has chosen. They are given by a function ĝi : Y ×Ai → R. Let
gi(a) =
∑
y
ĝi(y, ai)φ(y|a)
denote the expected payoff of player i given an action profile a. The joint payoff
from an action profile a is denoted by
G(a) =
n∑
i=1
gi(a)
The best reply or cheating payoff of player i is denoted by
ci(a) = max
a˜i
gi(a˜i, a−i).
In contrast to the action choices, we assume that all transfers are commonly ob-
servable. All players choose their monetary transfers simultaneously. We also
allow the players to burn money (one can think of the possibility to give money to
charity or any other non-interested third party). To have a bounded action space,
we assume for convenience that there exists an upper bound on a player’s trans-
fers. However, this upper bound shall be sufficiently large, so that we essentially
consider a situation of unlimited liability. Players are risk-neutral and utility is
linear in money and stage game payoffs. Thus, a player’s payoff in a period where
action profile a has been played and signal y has been realized is given by ĝi(y, ai)
minus the sum of the net payments that player i has made in the two payment
stages.
A public history h of the repeated game is a list of all monetary transfers and
public signals that have occurred before a given point in time. A (pure) public
strategy σi of player i in the repeated game maps every public history that ends
before the action stage into an action ai ∈ Ai, and every public history that ends
before a payment stage into a vector of monetary transfers. A public perfect
equilibrium is a profile of public strategies that constitutes mutual best replies
after every public history. We will restrict attention to pure strategies and public
perfect equilibria.6
6The restriction to public perfect equlibria is without loss of generality once mixed strategies
are excluded. The set of pure strategy PPE payoffs is the same as the set of pure strategy
sequential equilibrium payoffs.
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Payoffs and continuation payoffs of the repeated game are defined as average
discounted payoffs, i.e. as the discounted sum of future payoffs multiplied by
(1 − δ). We denote by u0(σ) the vector of payoffs in the repeated game given a
strategy profile σ.
2.2 Stationary strategy profiles
In this section, we introduce a class of stationary strategy profiles that allow a
simple characterization of PPE payoffs for every discount factor. These stationary
strategy profiles have the feature that the same action profile is played in every
period on the equilibrium path and punishments have a simple stick-and-carrot
structure.
While a strategy is supposed to specify gross amounts p˜ij that player i pays
to player j, where j = 0 means that the money is being burned, for convenience
we will describe all monetary transfers in stationary strategy profiles in form of
net payments. For any net payment, i.e. any vector p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ R
n with∑n
i=1 pi ≥ 0, one can find corresponding gross monetary transfers p˜ij with
pi =
n∑
j=0
p˜ij −
n∑
j=1
p˜ji,
and with the property that there is no player who at the same time makes and
receives positive monetary transfers.7
A stationary strategy profile is characterized by n+2 states. Play starts in the
up-front payment state, in which players are required to make up-front payments
p0. Afterwards play can be in one of n + 1 states, which we index by k ∈ K =
{e, 1, 2, ..., n}. We call the state k = e the equilibrium state and k = i ∈ {1, ..., n}
the punishment state of player i. A stationary strategy profile specifies for each
state k ∈ K an action profile ak ∈ A that will be played in the action stage.
Furthermore, it specifies for each state k ∈ K a payment function pk : Y → Rn
that maps the signal y from the preceding action stage into a required vector of
7Concretely, we can assume that gross monetary transfers from player i to j are given by
p˜ij =
{
pi
|pj |∑
j∈I
|pj |
if i ∈ I+ and j ∈ I−
0 otherwise.
where I+ = {i | pi > 0} is the set of net payers, I− = {i | pi ≤ 0} ∪ {0} be the set of net
receivers (including the sink for burned money).
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payments. Payments in the beginning of the period only occur in the upfront state
in the first period, but not in the equilibrium state or in a punishment state.
The state transitions are as follows: If no player unilaterally deviates from a
required payment, the new state becomes the equilibrium state: k = e. If player
i unilaterally deviates from a required payment, the new state becomes the pun-
ishment state of player i, i.e. k = i. In all other situations the state does not
change.
A stationary strategy profile σ is completely characterized by a vector of up-
front payments p0, its action plan (ak)k∈K that specifies one action profile for every
state k and its payment plan (pk)k∈K that specifies a payment function for every
state k. For a given discount factor δ, we call a stationary strategy profile σ a
stationary equilibrium if σ constitutes a public perfect equilibrium of the repeated
game. We denote by (ak, pk)k∈K a stationary strategy-profile without up-front
payments and by Σ0 the set of stationary equilibria without up-front payments.
The following definitions are useful for the characterization of stationary equi-
libria. For any payment function p, we let
E[pi|a] =
∑
y
pi(y)φ(y|a)
denote the expected payments of player i if the action profile a is played. For any
stationary strategy profile player i’s payoff at the beginning of a period in the
equilibrium state is
ui(σ) = gi(a
e)− E[pei |a
e].
Whenever the equilibrium in question is clear from the context, we will suppress
the dependence on σ. Similarly, the joint equilibrium state payoff is given by
U(σ) = G(ae)−
n∑
i=1
E[pei |a
e],
where the sum on the right hand side denotes the expected amount of money that
is burned on the equilibrium path. Player i’s continuation payoff at the beginning
of his punishment state is denoted by
vi(σ) = (1− δ)(gi(a
i)−E[pii|a
i]) + δui.
We call vi player i’s punishment payoff. We denote the sum of punishment payoffs
by
V (σ) =
n∑
i=1
vi.
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3 Main results
3.1 Conditions for stationary equilibria
Using the one shot deviation principle, we now establish the constraints that a
stationary strategy profile without up-front payments σ = (ak, pk)k has to satisfy
to be a stationary equilibrium. There are three types of constraints, which we call
payment constraints, budget constraints, and action constraints.
Payment constraints Given that player i has an equilibrium payoff of ui
and a punishment payoff of vi, he is never willing to make a higher payment
than δ
1−δ
(ui−vi). A stationary equilibrium thus must satisfy the following payment
constraints for all states k ∈ K:
pki (y) ≤
δ
1− δ
(ui − vi) for all i, y. (PC-k)
Budget constraints Even though players can burn money, they cannot get
any outside funding. In every state k, the following budget constraints must
therefore be satisfied:
n∑
i=1
pki (y) ≥ 0 for all y (BC-k)
Action constraints There are no incentives to deviate from the prescribed
action profiles in state k ∈ K if and only if
gi(a
k)− E[pki |a
k] ≥ gi(ai, a
k
−i)−E[p
k
i |ai, a
k
−i] for all i and ai ∈ Ai. (AC-k)
Next, we describe how the possibility of up-front payments transforms the set
of feasible payoffs. Up-front payments are incentive compatible if they do not
exceed δ
1−δ
(ui − vi) for any player. Incentive compatible up-front payments allow
any distribution of the joint equilibrium payoff that guarantees every player at
least his punishment payoff. This leads to the following straightforward result:
Proposition 1 If there exists a stationary equilibrium σ with joint equilibrium
payoffs U and punishment payoffs v then every payoff in the simplex
U0(σ) = {u0 ∈ Rn |
n∑
i=1
u0i ≤ U and u
0
i ≥ vi for all i} (1)
can be achieved by some stationary equilibrium that differs from σ only in the
up-front payments.
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Proof. Straightforward.
Note that the payoffs below the Pareto frontier of U0(σ) can be implemented
by burning some money up-front.
We say a payment plan (pk)k is optimal for a given action plan (a
k)k if it
maximizes the difference between joint equilibrium payoffs and total punishment
payoffs, U − V, subject to the equilibrium constraints. An optimal payment plan
thus solves the following linear program:
max
{pk}k∈K
U − V (LP-OPS)
s.t. (PC-k), (BC-k), (AC-k), for all states k ∈ K.
Proposition 2 Every payoff of stationary equilibria with action plan (ak)k can be
implemented by stationary equilibria whose payment plan is optimal for (ak)k. If
the linear program (LP-OPS) has no solution then there does not exist a stationary
equilibrium with action plan (ak)k.
Proof. Let U¯ denote the highest joint payoff and v¯i the lowest punishment
payoff of player i of all stationary equilibria with action plan (ak)k. We will
construct a stationary equilibrium with action plan (ak)k that has joint equilibrium
payoffs U¯ and at the same time punishment payoffs v¯i for each player i, which
implies an optimal payment plan. Let σe be a stationary equilibrium with action
plan (ak)k, some payment plan (p
k,e)k, and joint equilibrium payoff U¯ . Similarly,
let σi be a stationary equilibrium with action plan (ak)k, payment plan (p
k,i)k and
punishment payoff v¯i for player i.
We define the payment functions
pe(y) = pe,e(y)
pi(y) = pi,i(y) +
δ
1− δ
(ui(σ
e)− ui(σ
i)) for all i = 1, .., n.
The stationary strategy profile σ ∈ Σ0 defined by action plan (ak)k and payment
plan (pk)k has joint equilibrium payoff U¯ and punishment payoffs
vi = (1− δ)(gi(a
i)−E[pi,i|ai])− δ(ui(σ
e)− ui(σ
i)) + δui(σ
e) = v¯i.
It is clear that the action constraints (AC) of σ hold, since all payment functions
pk are only shifted by a constant from pk,k. To show that the budget constraints
hold we use the fact U¯ ≥ U(σi), which implies that
∑n
i=1 p
i
i(y) ≥ 0. The payment
10
constraints in the equilibrium state have to hold since v¯i ≤ vi(σ
e). The payment
constraints in player i’s punishment state are
pi,i(y) +
δ
1− δ
(ui(σ
e)− ui(σ
i)) ≤
δ
1− δ
(ui(σ
e)− v¯i) ,
which are equivalent to the payment constraints for player i’s punishment state in
σi. Thus, σ is a stationary equilibrium.
We say an action plan (ak)k is optimal for a given discount factor if no other
action plan can achieve a higher value of U−V. An optimal stationary equilibrium
has an optimal action plan and an optimal payment plan. We can now state one
key result:
Theorem 1 All public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a set
of optimal stationary equilibria that only differ by their up-front payments.
Proof. We rely on the recursive structure of public perfect equilibria and com-
pactness of the equilibrium value set (see e.g. the result in APS, which straight-
forwardly extend to our setting). Let U¯ denote the highest joint payoff that can
be implemented with some PPE and v¯i the lowest payoff for player i that can be
implemented with some PPE. There must exist a PPE σe without payments in
the first payment stage whose joint payoffs are given by
n∑
i=1
u0i (σ
e) = U¯ .
Furthermore, for every player i = 1, ..., n, there exists a PPE σi without payments
in the first payment stage that gives player i a payoff of
u0i (σ
i) = v¯i.
For all k ∈ K let ak be the first action profile played on the equilibrium path of
σk. Let wk(y) be the vector of continuation payoffs of σk in the first period after
signal y has been realized (but before the second payment stage), i.e. we have
u0i (σ
k) = (1− δ)gi(a
k) + E[wki |a
k].
We define
pki (y) =
δu0i (σ
e)− wki (y)
1− δ
,
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and will show that the stationary strategy profile σ defined by action plan (ak)k
and payment plan (pk)k is a stationary equilibrium. The budget constraints of σ
are equivalent to
δU¯ ≥
n∑
i=1
wki (y),
which holds due to the definition of U¯ as the highest possible sum of payoffs and
the fact that the sum of payments cannot be negative. Second, for the action
constraints, we have to show that
gi(a
k)−E[pki |a
k] ≥ gi(a
k
−i, ai)−E[p
k
i |a
k
−i, ai],
for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, ai ∈ Ai. This condition is equivalent to
gi(a
k)(1− δ) + E[wki |a
k] ≥ gi(a
k
−i, ai)(1− δ) + E[w
k
i |a
k
−i, ai],
which is the incentive constraint for playing ak in the first period of σk. Third,
for the payment constraints we have to show that
pki (y) ≤ δ(gi(a
e)− E[pei |a
e]− gi(a
i) + E[pii|a
i]).
With our definition of payments pki (y) this reads
δu0i (σ
e)− wki (y) ≤ δ(gi(a
e)(1− δ) + E[wei |a
e]− gi(a
i)(1− δ)− E[wii|a
i]),
which is equivalent to
wki (y) ≥ δv¯i.
Because v¯i is the lowest player i payoff in the action stage, this condition obvi-
ously holds if player i receives a net payment after signal y in the corresponding
continuation equilibrium of σi. It also holds for signals which require player i to
make a net transfer, because otherwise player i would have an incentive not to
make the payment and σi would not be a PPE. Player i’s expected payoff in the
stationary equilibrium σ is
gi(a
e)−
1
1− δ
E[δu¯ei − w
k
i (y)|a
e] = ui(σ
e),
and his punishment payoff is
gi(a
i)(1− δ)− E[δu¯ei − w
k
i (y)|a
i] + δu¯ei = v¯i.
12
It then follows from Proposition 1 that we can define incentive compatible up-front
payments for σ to implement any PPE equilibrium payoff.
Hence, the essential step to find the set of PPE payoffs is to find an optimal
action plan. For finite stage games, there is a simple brute force algorithm: Go
through all possible (n+1)-tuples of action profiles (ak)k ∈ A
n+1 and calculate
the corresponding maximum value of U − V by solving the linear program (LP-
OPS). We will now develop a quicker algorithm that relies on an explicit link
of the constraints for stationary equilibria with a series of static problems with
enforceable payments.
3.2 A characterization using static problems with enforce-
able payments
Consider the following static problem. The stage game is played once and there
exist enforceable contracts that specify for each player i = 1, .., .n and every signal
y ∈ Y a vector of gross monetary transfers to other players and an amount of
money burning. From an incentive perspective, only net payments are relevant.
We therefore write an enforceable contract as a payment function p(.) that specifies
the net payments pi(y) of player i if signal y realizes.
The possible payments that player i can make shall be bounded by an exoge-
nously given liquidity constraint λiL ≥ 0, with L ≥ 0, λi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1.
This means the totally available liquidity across all players is given by L and λ
denotes the liquidity distribution.
We say that an action profile a ∈ A can be implemented with a payment
function p(.) in the static problem given liquidity allocation λL, if the following
payment, budget and action constraints hold:
pi(y) ≤ λiL for all i, y. (PC)
n∑
i=1
pi(y) ≥ 0 for all y (BC)
gi(a)−E[pi|a] ≥ gi(a
′
i, a−i)−E[pi|a
′
i, a−i] for all i, a
′
i ∈ Ai. (AC)
Whether an action profile a can be implemented with some payment function
and how much money needs to be burned, does not depend on the liquidity distri-
bution λ, but only on the total liquidity L. More precisely, we have the following
straightforward result:
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Lemma 1 If the payment function p can implement an action profile a for the
liquidity allocation λL then the payment function p˜ with
p˜i(y) = pi(y) +
(
λ˜i − λi
)
L (2)
can implement a for the liquidity allocation λ˜L.
We define the liquidity requirement L(a) of an action profile a as the minimum
total liquidity L that is necessary to implement a in the static problem. Because
of Lemma 1, the liquidity requirement is independent of the actual liquidity dis-
tribution λ, and given as the solution to the following linear program:
L(a) = min
p(.),L≥0
L s.t. (PC), (BC), (AC). (LP-L)
To find closed-form solutions for L(a) in specific examples, it will often be conve-
nient to solve (LP-L) with a liquidity distribution that gives all liquidity to a single
player or distributes liquidity equally across players. The liquidity requirement of
an action profile a is 0 if and only if a is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
For a given value of total liquidity L ≥ L(a), we denote by U e(L, a) the maxi-
mum expected joint payoff that can be implemented with action profile a:
Ue(L, a) = max
p(.)
(
G(a)−
n∑
i=1
E[pi|a]
)
s.t. (PC),(BC), (AC). (LP-e)
Lemma 1 implies that the solution to the linear program (LP-e) is independent
of the chosen liquidity distribution λ. Observe that U e(L, a) is bounded, weakly
increasing and concave in L, and since we assumed a finite action space, it is
piece-wise linear with a finite number of kinks.8 Appendix A explains a method
that exploits these attributes in order to quickly compute U e(L, a). We denote by
L¯e(a) the lowest liquidity level for which Ue(L, a) attains its maximum value.
We now define a punishment payoff for player i in the static problem. For any
given action profile a, liquidity L ≥ L(a) and some arbitary liquidity distribution
λ, we define
vi(L, a) = min
p(.)
(gi(a) + λiL− E[pi|a]) s.t. (PC),(BC), (AC). (LP-i)
Again, because of Lemma 1, vi(L, a) is independent of the liquidity distribution
λ. Note that vi(L, a) is the lowest expected payoff that can be imposed on player
i in the static problem if no liquidity is given to player i.
8That Ue(L|a) is weakly increasing and bounded is obvious. Concavity and piece-wise lin-
earity follows from standard results on linear optimization.
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Lemma 2 It holds true that vi(L, a) ≥ ci(a), and if gi(a) = ci(a), then v
i(L, a) =
gi(a).
Proof. Since pi(y) ≤ λiL, the action constraint (AC) for player i implies
gi(a) + λiL− E[pi|a] ≥ gi(a
′
i, a−i) for all a
′
i ∈ Ai,
which implies vi(L, a) ≥ ci(a). In the case gi(ai) = ci(ai) one can take λi = 0 and
pi(y) = 0 for all y to implement a.
Similar to U e(L, a), the function vi(L, a) is bounded, weakly decreasing, convex
and piece-wise linear in L (with a finite number of kinks); efficient computation
techniques are also described in Appendix A. We denote by L¯i(a) the lowest liq-
uidity level at which vi(L, a) attains its minimum.
We now show how the solutions of the static problems are linked to stationary
equilibria of the repeated game.
Definition 1 We say that a liquidity L can be generated by action plan (ak)k∈K
given discount factor δ if
max
k∈K
L(ak) ≤ L ≤
δ
1− δ
(
U e(L, ae)−
n∑
i=1
vi(L, ai)
)
. (3)
The left hand side denotes the minimal liquidity that is required to implement
all action profiles of action plan (ak)k∈K in the separate static problems. The right
hand side can be interpreted as the maximum endogenous total liquidity that the
action plan can generate given that liquidity L is available. If some liquidity can
be generated by an action plan (ak)k∈K, there must exist a largest liquidity L
∗
that can be generated, and it satisfies
L∗ =
1− δ
δ
(
U e(L∗, ae)−
n∑
i=1
vi(L
∗, ai)
)
. (4)
That is because U e(L, ae)−
∑n
i=1 vi(L, a
i) is bounded, weakly increasing and con-
tinuous in L.
If an action plan (ak)k∈K can generate some liquidity given δ, we say that
(ak)k∈K is regular if the condition vi(L
∗, ai) ≤ vi(L
∗, ae) is satisfied, whereL∗ is
the maximum liquidity that can be generated.
Theorem 2 Fix a discount factor δ. Only if an action plan (ak)k∈K can generate
some liquidity, there exists a stationary equilibrium with action plan (ak)k∈K. If
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(ak)k∈K can generate some liquidity and is also regular, there exists a stationary
equilibrium with action plan (ak)k∈K. Then, if L
∗ denotes the largest generated
liquidity, an optimal payment plan yields joint equilibrium payoffs U e(L∗, ae) and
punishment payoffs vi(L∗, ai).
Proof. First, if there is a stationary equilibrium σ with action plan (ak)k∈K
and optimal payment plan (pk)k∈K, then the scalar L =
δ
1−δ
(U(σ) − V (σ)) is a
liquidity that can be generated by (ak)k∈K, since every action profile a
k can be
implemented with pk given L and λi =
ui−vi
U−V
.
Let us now assume that there exists a liquidity L generated by (ak)k, and hence
also a largest such liquidity L∗. In the following, we construct a liquidity distri-
bution λ∗ and a stationary equilibrium σ with action plan (ak)k∈K that satisfies
λ∗iL
∗ = δ
1−δ
(ui(σ)−vi(σ)). The payment constraints (PC-k) in σ and the payment
constraints in the static problem (LP-k) given liquidity λ∗ will coincide for all
states k.
Let λ be an arbitrary liquidity distribution and let p˜k be a payment function
that solves the static problem (LP-k) given liquidity allocation λL∗. Consider the
vector λ∗ defined by
λ∗i = δ
(
λi +
gi(a
e)− E[p˜ei |a
e]− vi(L∗, ai)
L∗
)
.
It is straightforward to check that λ∗i is a liquidity distribution if for all players
vi(L∗, ai) ≤ vi(L∗, ae), which holds due to regularity of (ak)k∈K. It follows from
Lemma 1 that the payment function
pk = p˜k + (λ∗ − λ)L∗
then solves the static problem for state k with liquidity distribution λ∗. For the
strategy profile σ ∈ Σ0 defined by action plan (ak)k and payment plan (p
k)k it
holds that
λ∗iL
∗ =
δ
1− δ
(ui(σ)− v
i(L∗, ai)).
Furthermore, it holds that vi(L∗, ai) = vi(σ) and U
e(L∗, ae) = U(σ). By con-
struction the payment, budget and action constraints of σ are satisfied.
While the action and budget constraints are the same in the static problem
of implementing all action profiles ak and the dynamic problem of finding a sta-
tionary equilibrium with action plan (ak)k, the payment constraints differ. In the
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static problem we can choose arbitrary liquidity distributions for every state but in
a stationary equilibrium player i’s maximal payments are limited in every state by
an endogenous bound that depends on equilibrium payoffs ui(σ) and punishment
payoffs vi(σ). In the proof, we construct payments and a particular liquidity dis-
tribution λ∗ such that also the payment constraints coincide in the two problems.
The steps to find an optimal payment structure and corresponding payoffs given
a regular action plan (ak)k∈K are as follows: First, calculate for all states the
liquidity requirements L(ak), as well as U e(L, ae) and all vi(L, ai) using some
convenient liquidity distributions. Second, solve equation (4) to find L∗ (which is
typically unique since U e(L, ae)−
∑n
i=1 v
i(L, ai) is concave in L). We then already
know the joint equilibrium payoffs Ue(L∗, ae) and punishment payoffs vi(L∗, ai)
and can obtain the set of equilibrium payoffs (see Proposition 1). The proof of
Theorem 2 also explains how an optimal payment plan can be derived from the
solutions of the static problems.
The following result establishes an upper bound on the size of required transfers
in an optimal payment plan, which guarantees that payments needed to implement
a given action plan do not go to infinity as the discount factor goes to 1. Note,
however, that in order to achieve every payoff that can be implemented with the
action plan, up-front payments may have to exceed the bound.
Proposition 3 If there exists a stationary equilibrium with action plan (ak)k,
there exists an optimal payment plan in which no player makes payments above
Lo = min{L∗,maxk{L¯
k(ak)}}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we take a payment function p˜e that
implements ae with minimal money burning given an arbitrary liquidity allocation
λL0 and define
λ∗i = δ
(
λi +
gi(a
e)− E[p˜ei |a
e]− vi(L∗, ai)
L∗
)
.
It is straightforward to check that λ∗i is a liquidity distribution. We define
pe = p˜e + (λ∗ − λ)Lo.
Because L0 ≤ L∗, it then holds that
λ∗iL
o ≤ δ
(
λ∗iL
o + gi(a
e)− E[pei |a
e]− vi(L∗, ai)
)
,
17
hence
λ∗iL
o ≤
δ
1− δ
(
gi(a
e)− E[pei |a
e]− vi(L∗, ai)
)
.
Let pi be the payment function that leads to a punishment payoff vi(Lo, ai) in the
problem (LP-i) given liquidity allocation λ∗L0. Then (pk)k is the payment plan we
were looking for.
3.3 Finding optimal action profiles
There is a natural procedure to find an optimal action plan and the payoff set for
all discount factors. While the results in the previous section took the action plan
as given, we are interested in optimal action profiles and corresponding payoffs in
order to find the set of PPE payoffs. We denote the upper envelope of all U e(L, a)
functions by
U¯ e(L) = max
a∈A|L(a)≥L
U e(L, a),
and by a¯e(L) an optimal action profile that solves this problem given liquidity L.
We denote the lower envelope of player i’s punishment payoffs by
v¯i(L) = min
a∈A|L(a)≥L
vi(L, a),
and a corresponding optimal punishment profile by a¯i(L). If the stage game is
symmetric then v¯i(L) is identical for all players and optimal punishment profiles
a¯i(L) are given by the corresponding permutation of a¯1(L), i.e. it suffices to
characterize the punishment state for player 1.
To determine these envelopes and optimal action profiles, it is often not nec-
essary to calculate the values U e(L, a) and vi(L, a) for all action profiles a. For
example, if the joint equilibrium payoff G(a) of an action profile a is lower than
the joint payoff of a stage game Nash equilibrium, a is clearly not an optimal
equilibrium state profile and we can dismiss it without any further calculation. In
Appendix A, we discuss several heuristics that speed up the calculation of U¯ e(L)
and v¯i(L).
We define the largest liquidity that can be generated with any action plan for
a given discount factor δ as
L¯(δ) = max{L | L =
δ
1− δ
(
U¯ e(L)−
n∑
i=1
v¯i(L)
)
}.
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The liquidity L¯(δ) can be generated by the action plan (a¯k(L¯(δ)))k and it follows
from Theorem 2 that (a¯k(L¯(δ)))k is an optimal action plan given δ. Together with
Theorem 1 this implies
Corollary 1 Given discount factor δ, the set of public perfect payoffs is given by
U0(δ) = {u0 ∈ Rn |
n∑
i=1
u0i ≤ U¯
e(L¯(δ)) and u0i ≥ v¯
i(L¯(δ))}. (5)
To calculate closed-form solutions for L¯(δ) and to determine the critical discount
factors δ where U¯ e(L¯(δ)) and v¯i(L¯(δ)) have a kink or jump, it is often convenient
to work with discount rates r = 1−δ
δ
. We denote by
r∗(L) =
U¯ e(L)−
n∑
i=1
v¯i(L)
L
(6)
and δ∗(L) = 1
1+r∗(L)
the discount rate and discount factor that correspond to some
liquidity level L.9 The numerator on the right hand side of (6) is a piece-wise
linear function in L and by piece-wise inverting this function, we can obtain the
largest liquidities L¯(δ) that can be generated for any discount factor. We illustrate
this procedure in Sections 4 and 5.
4 Perfect monitoring
With perfect monitoring, the played action profile is perfectly observable by all
players. This means that we have a game with perfect monitoring if the signal
space is equal to the action space, i.e. Y = A and the signal distribution is
φ(y|a) =
{
1 if y = a
0 if y = a
.
To implement an action profile a in the static problem, one can use a payment
function pˆ that requires each player i to pay ci(a) − gi(a) following any signal
(a′i, a−i) with a
′
i = ai, and to pay nothing otherwise. The liquidity requirement is
given by
L(a) =
n∑
i=1
(ci(a)− gi(a)) . (7)
9We define r∗(L) =∞ if L = 0.
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That this liquidity suffices to implement a can be seen by considering the liq-
uidity distribution λi =
ci(a)−gi(a)
L(a)
. That this liquidity is necessary follows from
summing up the action and payment constraints over all players.
With the payment function pˆ, no money will be burned on the equilibrium path.
Thus, for all L ≥ L(a) we find that the maximal implementable joint payoffs are
equal to the joint stage game payoffs:
U e(L, a) = G(a).
To calculate the minimal punishment payoffs vi(L, a) for player i and an action
profile a, consider a liquidity distribution λ that gives no liquidity to player i,
i.e. λi = 0. It follows from Lemma 1 that a can then be implemented with the
payment function p+ λL(a)− (c(a)− g(a)). We thus find that
vi(L, a) = ci(a),
i.e., player i’s minimal punishment payoff is always equal to his stage game cheating
payoff under his punishment profile ai. Given the derived closed-form solutions
for U e(L, a) and v(L, a), Theorem 2 translates into the following result:
Proposition 4 Under perfect monitoring there exist a stationary equilibrium with
action plan (ak)k∈K if and only if for every state k ∈ K
(1− δ)
n∑
i=1
(
ci(a
k)− gi(a
k)
)
≤ δ
(
G(ae)−
n∑
i=1
ci(a
i)
)
(PM-k)
Optimal payment structures then implement joint equilibrium payoff G(ae) and for
each player i a punishment payoff ci(a
i).
4.1 Finding optimal action structures for every discount
rate
We now describe a simple and quick algorithm that finds optimal action plans
for every discount factor if the stage game has finitely many action profiles. We
illustrate the algorithm for a simplified Cournot game taken from Abreu (1988).
Two firms simultaneously choose either low (L), medium (M), or high (H) output
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and stage game payoffs are given by the following matrix:
Firm 2
L M H
L 10, 10 3, 15 0, 7
Firm 1 M 15, 3 7, 7 −4, 5
H 7, 0 5,−4 −15,−15
The algorithm consists of different steps.
Step 1: The first step is to create a list of candidates for optimal equilibrium
action profiles. We order all action profiles a ∈ A decreasingly in their joint payoff
G(a) and break ties by putting action profiles with a lower liquidity requirement
L(a) first. Then we remove all action profiles from the list that do not have a
strictly lower liquidity requirement than all earlier action profiles in the list. In
the example, we get the following list:
No. ae G(ae) L(ae)
1. (L,L) 20 10
2. (L,M)10 18 4
3. (M,M) 14 0
.
Note that if the stage game has at least one Nash equilibrium then the last profile
of the list is always the Nash equilibrium with the highest joint payoffs.
Step 2: In a similar way, we create for each punishment state i = 1, ..., n a list
of action profiles. We order action profiles increasingly in player i’s cheating payoff
ci(a). We break ties by putting those profiles with a lower liquidity requirement
L(a) first. We remove action profiles that do not have a strictly lower liquidity
requirement than all earlier action profiles. In the example, we get the following
list for the punishment state of player 1:
No. a1 c1(a
1) L(a1)
1. (M,H) 0 6
2. (M,M) 7 0
If the stage game is symmetric, as in our example, the lists of punishment profiles
for the other players will simply consist of the correspondingly permuted action
profiles.
10Alternatively, we could pick the profile (M,L) as second element of the list.
21
Step 3: The first action profiles in each list form our initial action plan. In the
example, we have (ae = (L,L), a1 = (M,H), a2 = (H,M)). Proposition 4 allows
us to find the minimal discount factor for which a stationary equilibrium with this
action plan exists. As noted in the end of Section 3, it is convenient to reformulate
those conditions as a single condition on the discount rate r = 1−δ
δ
: There exists
a stationary equilibrium with an action plan (ak)k∈K if and only if the discount
rate r satisfies
r ≤ r∗ ≡
G(ae)−
∑n
i=1 ci(a
i)
maxk{L(ak)}
. (8)
where we assume r∗ = ∞ if all action profiles are Nash equilibria of the stage
game. The critical discount rate in our example is given by
r∗ =
20
max{10, 6}
= 200%.
This corresponds to a critical discount factor of δ∗ = 1
1+r∗
= 1
3
. Thus, by varying
the up-front payments, we can implement for every discount factor δ ∈ [1
3
; 1] every
(weakly) individually rational distribution of the maximum joint stage game payoff
of 20 as sequential equilibrium payoff of the repeated game.
It is straightforward that for any finite stage game, the minimal discount factor
δ∗ for which every individually rational distribution of the maximum joint stage
game payoff can be implemented is always strictly below 1. This result is a folk
theorem for games with side payments. For games without side payments, it
generally only holds true that every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff
can be implemented for sufficiently large discount factors.11
Step 4: In the next step, we replace the action profile ak that has the highest
liquidity requirement L(ak) by the next action profile in the list for state k. If
several action profiles of the action plan have the highest liquidity requirement, we
replace all those action profiles. In our example, we replace the equilibrium action
profile ae, so that the new action plan becomes ae = (L,M), a1 = (M,H), a2 =
(H,M). Using again formula (8), we find that this action plan can be implemented
whenever
r ≤ r∗ =
18
max{4, 6}
= 300%.
11Furthermore, in games with more than 2 players, the folk theorem without side payments
only holds under a regularity condition. See Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
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Correspondingly, for every discount rate δ ∈ [1
4
, 1
3
) the actual action plan is optimal
and the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is given by all (u1, u2) with
u1 + u2 ≤ 18 and u1, u2 ≥ 0.
We repeat step 4 until we reach the end of the list of action profiles in every
state k. The final action plan only consists of Nash equilibria of the stage game.
In the example, we find the following critical discount factors, payoffs and action
plans:
Step δ∗ U e v1 v2 a
e, a1, a2
1 1/3 20 0 0 (L,L),(M,H),(H,M)
2 1/4 18 0 0 (L,M),(M,H),(H,M)
*3 1/2 18 7 7 (L,M),(M,M),(M,M)
4 0 14 7 7 (M,M),(M,M),(M,M)
Note that the critical discount factor δ∗ does not necessarily decrease in every
step. If δ∗ it is not lower than in all previous steps, we simply ignore the corre-
sponding action plan. This is the case in step 3 of our example.
The algorithm always delivers a list of all critical discount factors, corresponding
payoff sets and optimal action structures. When using a heap sort algorithm to
create the n + 1 ordered lists, which each have a maximal length of |A| action
profiles, the computational complexity of our algorithm in terms of elementary
calculations and comparisons is of just log-linear order O(n|A| log |A|). Even large
stage games with more than a 100000 action profiles can be solved in less than a
second.
Kranz (2010) explains how to use the software implementation of our algorithm
and gives several examples. It is also illustrated how methods of adaptive grid
refinement and random sampling of action profiles allow to effectively compute
inner approximations to the sets of SPE payoffs for continuos stage games with
high dimensional action spaces (like oligopolies with 10 or more firms).12
12For games with perfect monitoring, Theorem 1 and Proposition 4 will also hold for stage
games with compact action spaces A ⊂ Rm and continous payoff functions. If one can provide
closed-form solutions of the cheating payoffs of the continous stage game, one can calculate the
liquidity requirement L(a) for any action profile a ∈ A.
To compute inner approximations of the sets of SPE payoffs, we can draw a finite random
sample of action profiles in order to calculate lower bounds of the functions U¯e(L) and v¯i(L)
in a similar way we calculated the step functions above. As the sample size grows large, these
lower bounds converge in probability to the true functions.
23
In comparison, we can note that allowing for monetary transfers allows much
faster computation of the set of equilibrium payoffs than in the framework studied
by Judd, Yeltekin and Conklin (2003) with public randomization. That is because
without monetary transfers no general closed-form solutions for the static problems
could be obtained, and in each iteration the algorithm of JYC has to solve several
linear programs.13
5 A Noisy Prisoners’ Dilemma game
In this example we derive closed form solutions for the set of pure strategy PPE
payoffs in a repeated noisy prisoners’ dilemma game with imperfect public moni-
toring. There are two players. In the stage game, a player can either cooperate C
or defect D. Expected payoffs g(a) are given by the following normalized payoff
matrix:
C D
C 1, 1 −s, 1 + d
D 1 + d,−s 0, 0
with d, s > 0 and d− s < 1. Players do not publicly observe the played action
profile, but only a realized signal y that can take four different values: yC , yD, y1
and y2. The signal distribution is as follows:
φ(y|a) CC CD DC DD
yC 1− αA − 2αP 1− αA − βA − 2αP − βP 1− αA − βA − 2αP − βA 0
yD αA αA + βA αA + βA 1
y1 αP αP αP + βP 0
y2 αP αP + βP αP 0
with 0 < αA ≤ αA+ βA and 0 < αP ≤ αP + βP and 1−αA− βA− 2αP − βP ≥ 0.
To interpret the signal structure, assume that mutual cooperation CC shall be
implemented.14 The signal yD is an anonymous indicator for defection: yD becomes
The practical issue is to sample action profiles in a way that achieves relatively quick conver-
gence for most stage games. Different methods are implemented in the software package and
work well in examples.
13JYC report a computation time of almost 45 minutes (on a Pentium 500Mhz, PC) for the
finest considered approximation for the payoff set of a discretized repeated Cournot duopoly
with 15 x 15 action profiles and a given discount factor of δ = 0.8
14For notational convenience, we abbreviate action profiles (a1, a2) by a1a2.
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more likely if some player unilaterally defects but its probability distribution does
not depend on the identity of the deviator. The parameter αA can be interpreted
as the probability of a type-one error, i.e. the probability that yD is observed even
if no player defected. The parameter βA measures by how much the likelihood of
yD increases if some player unilaterally deviates.
The signal yi is an indicator for unilateral defection by player i. Like αA, the
parameter αP can be interpreted as the probability of a type-one error, i.e. the
probability to wrongly get a signal for unilateral defection of player i. Similar
to βA, the parameter βP measures by how much the likelihood of yi increases if
player i unilaterally deviates from mutual cooperation.
To calculate the required liquidity to implement mutual cooperation in the
static problem, consider an equal liquidity distribution λ1 = λ2 =
1
2
. Clearly,
incentives to deviate for each player i are minimized if he is required to make the
maximal payments 1
2
L after signals yD and yi. Since the problem is symmetric, it
is disadvantageous to impose on some player a payment after signal yC. Whether
player i has to make a payment or receives a payment after signal y−i has no effect
on his incentives to deviate in the static problem. Mutual cooperation can thus
be implemented with total liquidity L if and only if
0 ≥ d− (βA + βP )
1
2
L,
which yields a liquidity requirement of
L(CC) =
2d
βA + βP
.
This formula is quite intuitive. If actions could be perfectly monitored, the liquid-
ity requirement would be 2d. This value is divided by the increase in the likelihood
to get a signal yi or yD if player i defects.
To minimize the amount of money burning, it is optimal that after signal y1
player 1 transfers all of his liquidity to player 2, and vice versa. Money burning can
only be optimal after signal yD. We find that for L ≥
2d
βP
, mutual cooperation can
be implemented without any money burning and that for L ∈ [L(CC), 2d
βP
), a total
amount of 2d−βPL
βA
must be burned after signal yD. The maximal implementable
joint payoffs are thus given by
U e(L,CC) =
{
2 if L ≥ 2d
βP
2(1− αA
βA
d) + αA
βA
βPL if
2d
βA+βP
≤ L ≤ 2d
βP
. (9)
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Let us now consider the asymmetric action profile CD. Its liquidity requirement
can be most easily calculated by assuming that the whole liquidity is allocated
to player 1. The minimal required payment p1(yD) after signal yD that removes
player 1’s incentives to defect satisfies
s+ (αA + βA)p1(yD) = p1(yD).
If after signal yD player 1 makes that payment p1(yD) to player 2 and no other
payments are made, no player has an incentive to deviate and no money is burned.
We thus find
L(CD) =
s
1− αA − βA
and
Ue(L,CD) = G(CD) = 1 + d− s.
For the action profile DC the same results hold and for the stage game Nash
equilibrium it is true that L(DD) = 0 and U e(L,DD) = 0.
For every level of total liquidity L, the profile DD is an optimal punishment
profile for both players, since the Nash equilibrium payoffs are min-max payoffs
for both players. Hence, we find vi(L) = 0 for all L ≥ 0.
Recall that in games with perfect monitoring, U
e
(L) − V (L) is always a step
function. The algorithm for perfect monitoring calculates the critical discount
rate r∗(L) at every jump point. With imperfect monitoring, U
e
(L) − V (L) is in
general an increasing piece-wise linear function with jumps. Figure 2 illustrates
the function U
e
(L)−V (L) for the noisy prisoners’ dilemma game for a parameter
constellation that satisfies βP > 0 and 0 < G(CD) < U
e(L(CC), CC).
The graph has a kink P1 and two jump points P2 and P3. We can calculate the
critical discount rate at every jump point, kink and increasing linear segment of
U
e
(L)− V (L) by using the formula
r∗(L) =
U
e
(L)− V
e
(L)
L
. (10)
For the points P1 and P2, we find
r∗
(
2d
βP
)
=
d
βP
and
r∗
(
2d
βA + βP
)
=
βP + βA − dαA
d
.
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Figure 1: Optimal action profiles and payoffs of the noisy prisoners’ dilemma game
On the line segment between the two points, i.e. for L ∈ [ 2d
βA+βP
; 2d
βP
], the maximal
discount rate is given by
r∗(L) =
2(1− αA
βA
d)
L
+
αA
βA
βP .
Money burning facilitates the implementation of CC if the maximal discount
rate increases when moving from P1 to P2. This is the case if and only if d ≤
βA
αA
.
Given a plot of U
e
(L) − V (L), as in Figure 1, there is a simple graphical rule
to find out whether the maximal discount rate increases or decreases along a line
segment. Consider the intercept at L = 0 of the line going through P1 and P2.
The critical discount rate increases from P1 to P2 if and only if this intercept is
positive. With a sharp glance, one can establish that this is indeed the case in
Figure 1.
Similarly, one can check graphically whether the maximal discount rate is higher
in point P3 than in point P2. In Figure 1, the intercept of the line through P2
and P3 is negative. This means that in the depicted case there is no discount
rate for which CD or DC are optimal equilibrium state profiles: playing CC
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with appropriate amounts of money burning yields higher payoffs and can be
implemented for a larger range of discount factors.
By solving equation (10) for L and plugging into the formula for U
e
(L), one
can find the maximal joint equilibrium payoff U e(r) as a function of the discount
rate r. For the case depicted in Figure 1, we find:
U e(r) =

2 if r ≤ d
βP
2(1− αA
βA
d)
[
1 + αA
rβP βA−αA
]
if d
βP
≤ r ≤ βP+βA−dαA
d
0 otherwise
. (11)
Together with the fact that always zero punishment payoffs can be implemented,
condition (11) characterizes the set of pure strategy sequential equilibrium payoffs
for the considered case. Alternative cases, e.g. parameter constellations where CD
is an optimal equilibrium state profile for some discount rates, can be characterized
in a similar fashion.
6 Repeated games without money burning
In this section we explore what can be achieved in a repeated game with side-
payments if money burning is not allowed. In particular, we investigate the ques-
tion to what extent money burning can be replaced by the use of a public corre-
lation device. We consider a variant of the previous set-up in which payments are
required to add up to zero, and in which players observe the outcome of a public
correlation device at the beginning of each period.
To characterize the set of PPE payoffs in this class of games, we extend ac-
tion and payment plans by a collective punishment state, indexed with k = b.
The public correlation device allows strategies that implement positive transition
probabilities between states. The proof of Theorem 3 below shows that all PPE
payoffs can be implemented by a class of stationary equilibria that put a posi-
tive probability on a transition to the collective punishment state instead of the
equilibrium state if all payments are conducted.
We will develop a more convenient characterization of equilibrium payoffs by
considering stationary equilibria that have an endogenous restriction on the amount
of money burning. Consider a stationary strategy σ of the game with money burn-
ing, which is described by states k with action profile ak and payment function pk.
We add a collective punishment state k = b with action profile ab and payment
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function pb that define an additional constraint on the amount of money burning
n∑
i=0
pki (y) ≤
δ
(1− δ)
(
U(σ)− U b
)
for all y (MBC-k)
with U b =
n∑
i=1
ubi and
ubi = (1− δ)(gi(a
b)−E[pbi |a
b]) + δui(σ).
Then we consider the following maximization problem over action plans and pay-
ment plans that are extended in this way
max
(ak,pk)k=e,b,1,...,n
U − V − U b (LP-OPS-LMB)
s.t. (PC-k),(AC-k),(BC-k) and (MBC-k) for all k = e, b, 1, ..., n.
Theorem 3 If LP-OPS-LMB is solved by a stationary equilibrium σ of the game
with money burning and collective punishment state action profile ab and payment
function pb, it holds that the set of PPE payoffs in the game without money burning
is given by {
u0 ∈ Rn|U b ≤
n∑
i=1
u0i ≤ U(σ), u
0
i ≥ vi(σ)
}
(12)
Proof. First we show that the set described in (12) is a subset of the set of
PPE payoffs without money burning.
Let (ak, pk)k=e,b,1,...,n be a solution of LP-OPS-LMB. The profile σ = (a
k, pk)k∈K
is a stationary equilibrium in the game with money burning with joint equilibrium
payoff U and punishment payoffs vi. It is augmented by a collective punishment
state with joint payoff U b. We now connect σ to the collective punishment state
to get a PPE σ˜ without money burning but with the same payoffs as σ. This
is done by replacing the money burning by an appropriate choice of transition
probabilities between the equilibrium state and the collective punishment state.
That is, the structure of the strategy σ˜ differs from the one of σ only in so far as
that if in state k = e, b, 1, ...n signal y has been realized and no player deviated
from the required payments pk(y), the state changes with a probability βkP (y) to
the collective punishment state and with probability 1− βkP (y) to the equilibrium
state. We define this probability as
βkP (y) =
1− δ
δ
∑n
i=1 p
k
i (y)
U − U b
. (13)
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Constraints (BC-k) and (MBC-k) tell us that βkP (y) indeed is a probability. Note
that on the equilibrium path of σ˜ there can be repeated stochastic transitions
between the equilibrium state and the collective punishment state.
We define the payment function of the strategy σ˜ in state k = e, b, 1, ..., n by
p˜ki (y) = p
k
i (y)−
δ
1− δ
βkP (y)(ui − u
b
i).
Up-front transfers are set to zero. The probabilities βkP (y) have been chosen such
that the payments p˜ki (y), i = 1, ..., n add up to zero. With this definition of
payments we have that
ui(σ˜) = (1− δ)(gi(a
e)− E[p˜e(y)|a]) + δui(σ˜) + δE[β
e
P |a
e](ubi(σ˜)− ui(σ˜))
ubi(σ˜) = (1− δ)(gi(a
b)−E[p˜b(y)|a]) + δui(σ˜) + δE[β
b
P |a
b](ubi(σ˜)− ui(σ˜))
reduces to
ui(σ˜) = ui and u
b
i(σ˜) = u
b
i .
After signal y in state k, continuation payoffs in σ˜ are equal to
−(1− δ)pki (y) + δui(σ).
Hence, actions in σ˜ are incentive compatible and the individual punishment payoffs
of σ˜ are equal to vi(σ). It is also straightforward to show that payments are
incentive compatible. By varying the up-front payments in σ˜ all divisions of the
surplus U(σ˜) in which each player gets at least vi can be achieved. Moreover, the
correlation device can be used in the up-front payment state to achieve all joint
payoffs between U and U b.
Second, we show that the set of PPE payoffs without money burning is a subset
of the set defined in (12).
Let U¯ and U¯ b denote the highest and lowest joint payoff that can be imple-
mented with some PPE in the repeated game without money burning. Similarly,
let v¯i denote the lowest payoff for player i that can be implemented with some
PPE. Let σe be a PPE with U(σe) = U¯ , σb a PPE with U(σb) = U¯ b and for every
player i, let σi denote a PPE with ui(σ
i) = v¯i. For all k = e, b, 1, ..., n let a
k be
the first action profile played on the equilibrium path of σk. Note that it always
holds true that
G(ab) ≤ U¯ b and U¯ ≤ G(ae).
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Let wk(y) denote the vector of continuation payoffs after signal y has been realized
in the first period according to σ˜k and define
pki (y) =
δui(σ
e)− wki (y)
1− δ
.
That the action, payment and budget constraints are satisfied follows as in the
proof of Theorem 1. To see that money burning constraints (MBC-k) are satisfied
note that
n∑
i=1
pki (y) =
δU¯ −
∑n
i=1w
k
i (y)
1− δ
≤
δ
1− δ
(
U − U b
)
.
Hence, (ak, pk)k=e,b,1,...,n solves LP-OPS-LMB with value U¯ − Σ
n
i=1v¯i − U¯
b.
6.1 Characterization based on static problems with en-
forceable payments
We can derive similar links to static problems than in games with unlimited money
burning. Consider the static problem of Section 3.2, with the extra restriction that
there is an upper bound B ≥ 0 on the amount of money that is allowed to be
burned after any signal y. We denote by L(a,B) the liquidity requirement of an
action profile with that upper bound on money burning:
L(a,B) = min
p(.)
L s.t. (PC), (AC), (BC) and (LP-B-L)
n∑
i=0
pi(y) ≤ B for all y ∈ Y (MBC)
Similarly, we define for all L ≥ L(a,B) and 0 ≤ B ≤ L the highest joint equilib-
rium payoff in the static problem by
U e(L,B, a) = max
p(.)
(
G(a)−
n∑
i=1
E[pi|a]
)
(LP-B-e)
s.t. (PC),(BC), (AC), (MBC),
the lowest collective punishment payoff by
U b(L,B, a) = min
p(.)
(
G(a)−
n∑
i=1
E[pi|a]
)
(LP-B-b)
s.t. (PC),(BC), (AC), (MBC),
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and player i’s punishment payoff by
vi(L,B, a) = min
p(.)
(
gi(a) + λiL−
n∑
i=1
E[pi|a]
)
(LP—B-i)
s.t. (PC),(BC), (AC) and (MBC).
The corresponding upper and lower envelopes over all action profiles are denoted
by
U¯ e(L,B) = max
a∈A
Ue(L,B, a),
U¯ b(L,B) = min
a∈A
U b(L,B, a),
vi(L,B) = min
a∈A
vi(L,B, a).
The profiles at which these values are attained are denoted by ak(L,B). We say
a pair (L,B) of liquidity and bound on money burning can be generated by a
discount factor δ if
max
k=e,0,1,...,n
L(ak(L,B), B) ≤ L ≤
δ
1− δ
(U e(L,B)− V (L,B)) ,
B ≤
δ
1− δ
(
U e(L,B)− U b(L,B)
)
.
Let (L∗, B∗) denote the (element-wise) largest pair of liquidity and bound on
money burning that can be generated. If some pair (L,B) can be generated, a
largest such pair must always exists, since larger levels of B allow larger consistent
levels of L and vice versa.
Proposition 5 Let (L∗, B∗) be the largest consistent liquidity and bound on money
burning given discount factor δ. The set of equilibrium payoffs that can then be
implemented are{
u ∈ Rn | U¯ b(L∗, B∗) ≤
n∑
i=1
ui ≤ U¯
e(L∗, B∗) and ui ≥ v
i(L∗, B∗) for all i
}
.
(14)
Proof. The proof proceeds similarly as the proof of Theorem 2 and is therefore
omitted.
To compute the functions Ue(L,B, a), U b(L,B, a) and vi(L,B, a) for all L ≥
L(a,B) and B ≤ L one can exploit the fact that their surface is described by
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a finite number of planar segments, which can be characterized by methods of
parametric linear programming and sensitivity analysis (see, e.g., Gal and Nedoma,
1972). The computations can take considerably longer than computing the one-
dimensional functions for the case of unlimited money burning. Still, one may be
able to obtain closed-form solutions for simple signal structures.15 Once U¯ e(L,B)
and vi(L,B) are fully characterized, optimal action structures for all discount
factors can be very quickly obtained.
A sufficient condition for the equilibrium payoff set not to be affected by the
possibility to burn money, is that a single stage game Nash equilibrium ab is
an optimal punishment profile for all players. Both the collective punishment
payoff U b and the sum of individual punishment payoffs V are then equal to G(ab)
and the payment constraints imply the money burning constraints. Hence, our
characterization of the payoff sets in the noisy prisoners’ dilemma game remains
valid even if no money burning is allowed. In addition, we have already found that
the restriction not to burn money does not shift the Pareto frontier of the set of
equilibrium payoffs in games with perfect monitoring.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a characterization of equilibrium payoff sets for infi-
nitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers. Monetary
transfers are a realistic assumption and at the same time greatly simplify the
analysis. Our results can be used to numerically compute the equilibrium payoff
sets for any finite stage game and they also facilitate the finding of closed-form
analytical solutions.
One interesting direction for future work is to study to which extend monetary
transfers, in conjunction with communication, allow a tractable characterization
of payoff sets for games with private monitoring or for the set of mixed strategy
equilibrium payoffs in games with public monitoring. The problem becomes con-
siderably more complicated, since it is not necessarily optimal to use a payment
plan that induces full information revelation in every period (see, e.g. Fuchs, 2007,
for an analysis in a principal agent framework).
Another direction for future research is to study optimal renegotiation-proof
15For example, in the noisy prisoner’s dilemma game and the action profile a = CC, we find
L(a,B) = 1
βP
(2d−BβA) and U
e(L,B, a) is given as in equation (9).
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equilibria in a framework with monetary transfers and imperfect public monitor-
ing. If we would only consider stationary equilibria, a natural, minimal renegotiation-
proofness requirement is that after no history there shall be money burning. An
interesting question is whether there is a concept of renegotiation-proofness for
which every renegotiation-proof payoff can be implemented with a stationary equi-
librium without money burning.
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Appendix A: Computing U e(L, a) and U
e
(L)
This appendix illustrates how U e(L, a) and U
e
(L) can be exactly computed and
describes heuristics to reduce computation time. Similar methods can be applied
to the computation of vi(L, a) and vi(L).
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Figure 2: Constructing U e(L|a)
Calculating Ue(L, a) Assume that we have calculated Ue(L, a) at two different
levels L0 < L1 illustrated by the points P0 and P1 in Figure 2. We describe a
procedure that fully computes U e(L, a) on the interval [L0, L1]. From the dual
values of the solution of the problem (LP-e) we can get the slope of U e(L, a) at L0
and L1.
16 Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding tangents. The two tangents either
coincide or have a cut point Pc = (Lc, Uc) with L0 < Lc < L1 and U0 < Uc < U2.
In the first case, Ue(L, a) is given on the interval [L0, L1] by the line P0P1. In
the second case the line P0PcP1 constitutes an upper bound on U
e(L, a). We
calculate Ue(Lc, a). If U
e(Lc, a) = Uc then U
e(L, a) coincides with this upper
bound P0PcP1. Otherwise, we proceed recursively by calculating U
e(L, a) on the
two intervals [L0, Lc] and [Lc, L1]. If there are nk ≥ 2 kinks between L0 and L1,
this procedure fully characterizes the function U e(L, a) on the interval by solving
16If Ue(L|a) has a kink at L, it depends on the way the linear program is set up, whether the
dual values delivers the right hand or left hand slope. It is no problem to calculate, the correct
slope, however.
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at most 2 (nk − 1)+1 times the linear program (LB-e). To quickly solve (LP-e) at
different levels of L, one can use standard re-optimization techniques, e.g. based
on the dual simplex algorithm.17
The lowest possible level of L is given by the liquidity requirement L(a). The
right hand starting point of our procedure is given by the minimal liquidity L
e
(a)
above which Ue(L, a) does not anymore increase in L. We can calculate L
e
(a) by
adding a restriction on the maximal allowed expected amount of money burning
in the problem (LP-L).18
Calculating the upper envelope U
e
(L) For the calculation of the upper
envelope U
e
(L), let us define by
Ue(L, A˜) = max
a∈A˜
Ue(L, a)
the upper envelope with respect to a subset of action profiles A˜ ⊆ A. Hence, we
have
Ue(L, A˜ ∪ {a}) = max{U e(L, A˜), Ue(L, a)}.
We can calculate U
e
(L) by subsequently adding all action profiles to the set A˜. To
calculate the new envelope U e(L, A˜∪{a}), it is often not necessary to compute the
whole function U e(L, a). Recall, that the method to calculate Ue(L, a) delivers in
each step an upper bound on Ue(L, a). It suffices to proceed the calculation of
U e(L, a) only for those values of L where the upper bound exceeds U e(L, A˜).
If an upper bound of U e(L, a) lies everywhere below U e(L, A˜), we can immedi-
ately dismiss the action profile a. Since U e(L, a) is bounded by G(a), a sufficient
condition to dismiss a is that G(a) ≤ Ue(L(a), A˜). A weaker sufficient condition
is G(a) ≤ Ue(L˜(a), A˜), where L˜(a) ≡
∑n
i=1 (ci(a)− gi(a)) is the liquidity require-
ment under perfect monitoring, which always satisfies L˜(a) ≤ L(a). The last
17Moreover, using a simplex algorithm, the case Ue(Lc, a) = Uc can sometimes be veri-
fied without the need of solving the linear program (LP-e) at Lc. A sufficient condition for
Ue(Lc, a) = Uc is that the the optimal (dual) basis of the solved problem at L0 (or L1) remains
an optimal basis at Lc. This condition can be checked with standard formulas used to calculate
sensitivity bounds. However, it can happen that the optimal basis changes between L0 and Lc
even though the function Ue(L|a) has no kink between L0 and Lc.
18If the full-dimensionality condition of the folk theorem by Maskin, Fudenberg and Levine
(1994) holds we must impose zero money burning to calculate L. Otherwise, we first have to
solve the problem (LB-e) with unlimited liquidity to calculate the minimally required amount
of money burning.
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condition can be checked very quickly since no linear program has to be solved for
a.
The order in which action profiles are added to A˜ can influence the total com-
putation time, because action profiles can be more quickly dismissed if U e(L, A˜)
is already large. One should first add all Nash equilibria of the stage game, which
satisfy U e(L, a) = G(a) for all L ≥ 0. An educated guess about which optimal
action profiles are likely to be optimal, e.g. symmetric ones, can be furthermore
helpful.
Punishment states Similar methods can be used to calculate vi(L, a) and
vi(L). For the computation of vi(L), it is helpful to first add to A˜ all those
action profiles a where ai is a best-reply to a−i, since these action profiles satisfy
vi(L, a) = gi(a) for all L ≥ L(a).
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